Bitcoin’s decentralized consensus mechanism is based on some intelligent incentive structures. The first and basic rule is that the chain that has most of the work is the right rule. This individual rule avoids the need for a central arbitrator, determining the correct chain as a function of the efforts of thousands of decentralized parties, each of which tries to extend Blockchain. Support for miners continues to move Blockchain forward, creating a painful opportunity for workers who do not love advice. In addition to modifying the difficulty, these mechanisms put the theoretical framework of a series that travels forward, one time in time, with clarity of approximately 100 % over the past fifteen years.
The only warning is that if one of the miners or coalition workers from miners are able to organize more than 50 % of retail, they will have the ability to write over modern blocks, and to ban other miners from writing future blocks, and identify the transactions that are recorded in the Professor’s book The ecclesiastical. It is clear that this is a disaster; The entire point was to avoid the position in which one party was controlling. So the final binding piece of the game theory designed by Satoshi is that there are some incentives to prevent this from happening. As shown in the white paper:
The incentive may help encourage the contract to stay honest. If the greedy attacker is able to collect the strength of the CPU more than all the honest nodes, he will have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing his paid, or using it to generate new coins. It must find that it is more profitable than the rules, such rules that prefer it with new coins more than anyone else combined, rather than undermining the regime and the validity of its wealth.
He must find that it is more profitable than the rules
In fact, this is the basis for all game theory in Bitcoin. Bitcoin logical if and only, at any time, at least 50 % of miners are stimulated to stay honest. This has been the case since 2009.
The most important part of the theory is the most important part of the theory is the reason that it should find it more profitable to play with rules. The answer, in 2009, 2010, 2011, and every year since then he has always been: because if he did not, he will collapse. If it collapsed, the Bitcoin experience has ended, and the miners who did that owner of the lower owner to praise the landfill are full of electronic waste that are valuable. This was what Satoshi was referring to, which is why society was panic in 2014 when a group of gash exceeded 50 % of retail. The idea that one party (even if it is a gathering) can take over the system this is the disastrous failure that everyone tries to avoid.
In the game theory is understood that a person in theory can direct more than 50 % of an honorable retail, forcing a constitutional crisis. But the natural result of this crisis is the mutual destruction of all mines and holders. This is the ultimate deterrent of misconduct.
Note that the theoretical possibility of the 51 % attack is present forever, regardless of the current retail, electricity, cooling or new ASIC costs. This is the portable result of the fact that 51 % <100 %: at any time, a malware gathering can be created, and 60 % of miners can join this complex. The fact of the matter is that recently, 100 % of miners are mining the producers. It is always a matter of incentives, not physical reasonable.
For those outside the system, who do not have any names, the security model is prohibited from attacking the system. But the security model is designed not only to protect from external threats (it is an open system after all) it is designed to protect from actors inside The system is also. Miners not only protect the regime from the non -planned, but also protect the regime from other miners.
Consider selfish mining. This technique is sporty to give a feature of 34 % of miners who implement this technology beyond the difficulty of adaptation. Selfish mining does not involve explicit theft or even control, but rather a better return on investment for workers who will form the coalition. Modern reports have developed a share of mining workers from the best mining companies that have publicly held about 30 % and grow. Throw in a few mines from the private sector and reach the selfish mining threshold. Does it seem that selfish mining is inevitable? All that is required is that a group of miners includes 34 % to jump on the call and start the process; Three weeks later, bonuses. However, you have not yet tried for groups of miners. Why this?
Selfish mining represents a major violation of standards; The crossing of this line will lead to Bitcoin to a bad place where the competing groups take them out. The grand prize of the winner is to control monopoly, according to which the monopolistic mining factor gets to keep all fees and banning benefits, can reduce his humor to enhance profits, and can even negotiate the fees directly or even specify their fees. But this will be a catastrophe for Bitcoin. For this reason, no one begins this call.
I wrote a chapter in my book on the theory of the download game, as I analyzed this problem exactly with regard to monopolistic mining. The analysis is a comparison of the accumulated profits of 51 % coalition, divides the rewards of a monopoly chain, or small profits due to the large alliance if the competitive course is adhered to. In the early days, the answer was clear: monopolistic mining had destroyed everything, so there was no incentive to form the coalition.
Enter USG
If USG adheres to a plan, over the years and decades, to invest in Bitcoin, they will have created something that could not fail. It is simply not possible. Regardless of the one who is priced, what are the parties that use the chain, cannot fail, and will not fail. If there is a constitutional crisis about mining, this crisis will be resolved and resolved in a very clear way.
There are several ways to solve a constitutional crisis, when you expand your window to include central options. In the first days, these options could be ignored as lower than failure, but if failure was not an option, all options will be considered. The simple assertion of the brute force of 51 % power by USG and the mine workers stadium under control of the United States is a single option (this mining mining does not require monopoly for control.) Another applicable solution is a soft work that only allows new clusters by traded miners workers in public. It is clear that the class is proven on the table. Another option is to convert the Bitcoin Utxo collection into CBDC whose transactions have been confirmed by FED. This would bring bitcoin to the fans with lightning speed and achieve a huge value to the first holders.
The important point is that under this system, monopolistic mining is no longer a failure in itself. Any coalition of miners can follow the mining mining, from selfish mining and linking their alliance to 51 %. As long as they do nothing that disturbs USG directly, they cannot break the system. If they make a monopoly mining, USG still exists, Bitcoin.
In short, USG successfully stimulates Bitcoin in the future removes the final Bitcoin weapon against centralization; Failure option.
It is difficult to imagine that miners who are fighting for small profit margins will continue in the theater of decentralization, when they have to find a more profitable mine to form an alliance and monopoly, which is not strict, they do not oppose the rules.
This is a guest function by Mika Warren. The opinions that are expressed are completely property and do not necessarily reflect the views of BTC Inc or Magazine Bitcoin.